Revisiting "Art and Money Online"

Julian Stallabrass

Lise Autogena and Joshua Portway, *Black Shoals/ Stock Market Planetarium*, 2001

Imagine looking up at a night sky that is also a live representation of the global stock market. Each star represents a company, and these stars cluster together or drift apart, glow faintly or fiercely, and change color depending on the movements of their stocks. This is *Black Shoals/ Stock Market Planetarium*, a work by Lise Autogena and Joshua Portway. Imagine, too, that at the time of its first display in 2001, viewers, lying back on their bean bags and staring up into the dome, could see the dramatic after-effects on the starfield of the dot.com crash.

That crash had marked the end of a hugely inflated speculative bubble, based—prematurely, as it turned out—on the supposed riches to be prospected from the commercialization of the internet. Before Amazon was profitable and before the rise of the social media monopolies, investors had been pouring money into debt-ridden dot.com companies that ran at a loss. Bubbles are inflated by a collective belief in future growth, and the crash was caused by the loss of that faith. It put the relations between finance, commerce and the internet to the front of

many people's minds, and was among the reasons that I decided to curate an exhibition entitled *Art and Money Online* at the Tate Gallery.[1] To revisit the show in 2024 is to gain a glimpse into what is in online terms a distant past, and to think about what that past might tell us about trajectories into the present.

I had initially wanted to set up a café-style internet space where guides would help users to navigate works of net.art, alongside installed gallery pieces. The idea was to widen the audience for this art beyond the small minority of people who had familiarity with both online culture and the history of modern and avant-garde art, which were necessary to understand it. The eventual exhibition was very different, showing just three works in the Art Now space. Each of them stood as contrasting models of art-world engagement with the internet and the economy: Redundant Technology Initiative's *Free Agent*, Thomson and Craighead, *CNN Interactive Just Got More Interactive*, and *Black Shoals*.[2] Although the Art Now space was meant to exhibit up-and-coming artists and "cutting-edge" art, this was the first time anyone had shown there who was not in the stable of a private gallery—an indication of how state art institutions were, and are, in thrall to the commercial art world.

The Virtual Commons

Redundant Technology Initiative (RTI), a Sheffield-based group, was known for establishing a community computing space which provided "no cost" technology to local people, many of them unemployed, in that long-depressed region which had been battered by Thatcher's assault on the industrial economy in the 1980s and had since seen little recovery. Remember that in 2001, wi-fi and broadband were very new, and most people experienced the internet on computers plugged into dial-up modems, as phone companies charged by the minute. Users of the computer center who helped out there earned, not money, but RTI credit slips that could be set against the center's fees.[3]

The political and social implications of the cost of a new computer and online access were invoked by RTI's founder, James Wallbank, in his "Lowtech Manifesto":

> A lot of people say that new media is revolutionary. They say the net is anarchic and subversive. But how subversive can you be in an exclusive club, with a $1000 entrance fee?[4]

The center could be free because it used Open Source software and donated old hardware. At the Tate, RTI showed *Free Agent*, a bank of these old machines displaying a low-res animation, using material from websites that sought to attract users by offering apparently free stuff. The

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[1] This opportunity was provided by a year-long Paul Mellon fellowship during which I was to develop an exhibition and write a publication—the book *Internet Art: The Online Clash of Culture and Commerce* (London, 2003).

[2] My period working with the Tate was one of great change for the institution, as its London element split into two, becoming Tate Modern and Tate Britain. They were interesting times, but for me it meant a lot of uncertainty, and several changes in the scale of the show, its location and budget.

[3] This was to create an alternative micro economy in what was effectively a limited LETS scheme. On LETS, see Finn Bowring, "LETS: An Eco-Socialist Alternative", *New Left Review*, no. I/ 232 (November-December 1998), pp. 91-111.

[4] http://lowtech.org/projects/n5m3/

underlying ideal behind RTI was that the mix of bartered labor, the general intellect embodied in the software and its documentation, and "redundant" but still functional hardware could be used to mark out a commons: an environment of collective solidarity which offered people the opportunity to develop their skills and pursue their own projects. Set against the rapid process of commercialization of online spaces by huge corporations, "redundant" Sheffield inhabitants, replaced by automation or outsourced jobs in low-wage economies, could demonstrate that in the new economy, cooperation was more important than capital to the creation of value.[5]

Redundant Technology Initiative, *Free Agent*, 2000-1.

Since 2001, James Wallbank has continued to create a digital commons through Access Space, which also shares expertise, uses free or Open Source software and older equipment, and has expanded into making things using laser cutters and other tools.[6] This activity, funded by bodies such as the Arts Council England and the European Social Fund, shows that the model has long-term viability. In many places—not least the north of England—the need for such a commons has only grown, as austerity policies have shut down libraries and other facilities, and increased inequality, poverty, and oppression. Where state powers support such ventures, as in Brazil

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[5] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri had recently published their influential and controversial book, *Empire*, which made just this claim. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, (Cambridge, MA 2000) p. 294.
[6] About Access Space – Access Space (access-space.org)

under the PT governments to which Wallbank has acted as an advisor, hundreds of these centers have been founded.[7]

Since 2001, though, the nascent commercialization and monopolization of the internet have proceeded apace. Local victories against its dominance—as in the etoy/eToys case in which an independent art group, booted off their site with a lawsuit, took down the corporation responsible—proved to be only that.[8] The titanic forces against which the commons is arrayed was evoked in a work by Übermorgen, called *Google Will Eat Itself*, which used the money raised from running Google adverts on hidden websites to buy shares in the company. The idea of this "autocannibalism" was to eventually buy out the entire company and hand it over to its users. It would take a while though—over 200 billion years.[9]

At the same time, there has been a profound transformation as a newer monopoly model has overlaid the old, and as social media monopolies curate the advertising-laden frame of an oceanic mass of diverse and distributed material and knowledge.[10] The old monopoly ambition of becoming a price-setter rather than a price-taker is still at work, much augmented by the power of digital coordination in sites such as Amazon: the last thing huge corporations want, after all, is a free market—who can make any money out of that?

The monopolization of the internet, the carving up of the commons into massive, increasingly siloed proprietary spaces, intensely surveilled, and ruled by secret algorithms, is a striking instance of the general tendency of giant corporations to seek monopoly through effects of scale. They buy up or lock out would-be competitors, and trap users on platforms from which the price of exit is the loss of contacts.[11] In a deep perversion of the net ideal as library and forum, the urge is to mine data from every aspect of life, and so to monetize every social interaction.[12]

Back in 2006, David Garcia remarked that the techniques of tactical media were being adopted and commercialized by the experimental wing of the so-called "creative industries", which were giving birth to social media.[13] The old co-exists with a new model in which services are offered apparently for "free" (as in the sites that RTI's *Free Agent* used as source material) at the price of the data mined from users. The pioneer of free software, Richard Stallman, had famously said: "Don't think free as in free beer; think free as in free speech."[14] The artist collective Superflex brought the two together in a work called *Free Beer*, issuing a beer recipe and brand under a Creative Commons' license under which brewing equipment was installed in various places to make and give away beer to visitors.[15] Unlike Superflex's beverage, the new monopolies' offer of "free beer" comes at the price of exposure to closed, manipulative systems that corrupt free

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[7] Wallbank's involvement with Brazil's MetaReciclagem programme is discussed in Heitor Shimizu, "Innovation Based on Obsolescence", *Agência FAPESP* (April 17, 2017).

[8] See https://etoy.com/projects/toywar/

[9] https://gwei.org/index.php

[10] This point was made by James Wallbank in conversation with the author.

[11] This is the tendency described in a pioneering book of the 1960s: Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1968). On the artificial silos, see Cory Doctorow, *The Internet Con: How to Seize the Means of Computation* (London, 2023).

[12] Nick Srnicek, *Platform Capitalism* (Cambridge, 2017), pp. 48, 98, 112.

[13] David Garcia, 'Learning the Right Lessons', *Mute*, (January 25, 2006).

[14] As quoted in Sam Williams, *Free as in Freedom: Richard Stallman's Crusade for Free Software* (Sebastapol, CA, 2002), p. 131.

[15] https://superflex.net/works/free_beer Free beer was given away at the 2008 Taipei Biennial, for example.

speech, and are designed to stimulate the consumption of swiftly disposable goods. The resultant "collective"—as we know all too well—is toxic to its users' mental states, social relations and the environment.[16]

The Media Monopolies

Thomson and Craighead, *CNN Interactive Just Got More Interactive*, 2001

The artist duo Jon Thomson and Alison Craighead became known for making art that mined the popular areas of the net as they existed before social media, including games, chat rooms, and animated GIFs, and sometimes marrying their strange, quasi-anthropological findings with computer dysfunction. For example, when a user clicked on their work *Pet Pages* (1998), it opened hundreds of windows in the form of trading cards which graded sites devoted to pets

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[16] This is the linked and reinforced poisoning of each realm theorized in Félix Guattari, *The Three Ecologies*, trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton (London, 2014).

with mock classifications. Since these rapidly filled the entire screen, the user either had to laboriously close each one individually or restart their computer. In their apparently wide-eyed tramp through online oddities, Thomson and Craighead offered critique through estrangement.

Thomson and Craighead, *Pet Pages*, 1998

In their work for the Tate, *CNN Interactive Just Got More Interactive*, they adapted an online work which allowed the user to choose from a few cheesy, emotionally oriented muzak tracks to accompany live news. For the gallery, this was presented in the Tate's sparse, dignified space as a sculptural object in which a screen was built into a plinth, ironically framing CNN's website.

This work raised various issues: it focused attention on the nexus of news and entertainment, which was more of a subterranean issue then than now, as the muzak altered the perception of the web design, the framing of narratives, the parade of newsworthy catastrophes, and the appearance of branded politicians and other celebrities. Offering a ludic but extremely limited series of options, it also pointed to the impoverished character of much online interaction, and the common charge made against interactive work: that it manipulated its users. Finally, it highlighted the sometimes fraught and sometimes comic experience of online work when seen in a public installation: how do users behave when they know that their interactions are being watched by other gallery-goers?

Stallabrass, Revisiting "Art and Money Online", p. 6

Thomson and Craighead have since made other works that have developed the concerns of the CNN piece. *Decorative Newsfeeds* (2004) offered an evolving animated video projection of live news headlines, framing crisis and trivia alike in pleasant looping text patterns.[17] In *Driving through Las Vegas* (2002), users could again choose a soundtrack, this time to accompany a video journey through that ground zero of money, glitz and psychological manipulation (and, architecturally, of postmodernism).[18]

The charge of the CNN work has radically changed as in the media realm, the old monopoly models have been weakened and overlaid with the new. Ben Bagdikian's classic book of 1983, *The Media Monopoly*, showed how the effects of monopoly capitalism increased the leverage of advertisers, especially of the largest corporations, internalizing business-friendly modes of reporting, and favoring "lifestyle" features over serious news.[19] Further, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman demonstrated the sweeping extent to which big media businesses distort the news to echo mainstream and particularly government views, rarely if ever allowing alternative and critical voices an airing.[20] The old ideal of journalistic objectivity had been adopted as monopoly took hold of the print media: the ideas was that if political diversity was no longer reflected in, say, a city's several newspapers, at least the one that survived could report honestly, and keep its bias to the opinion pages.[21] Chomsky and his many followers showed even that to be an illusion.[22]

Powerful forces have since undermined even the façade of objectivity. First, when a few large corporations divide up the media between them—muting competition on price and doing all they can to cut costs and increase profits—the quality of their "product" declines and their customers have nowhere else to go.[23] (Social media users will be familiar with that disillusion.) The ability of newspapers, magazines, and TV stations to do investigative reporting was systematically undermined. Then, openly neo-conservative proprietors bent their media outlets to their politics, all the while denying that they would countenance any such thing. Rupert Murdoch was a pioneer here in his sway over his newspapers and later TV stations, which noisily promoted authoritarian governments, the wars waged by the West, and climate-change denial. Unsurprisingly, public trust in the mass media went into prolonged and sustained decline.

Later, the old media monopoly was broken open with cable TV, political radio, and then social media. The nexus of news as entertainment is now in plain sight across social media and in the open fabulations of the printed press and TV, in a partisan, post-truth infotainment. This is no free-for-all in which all views thrive, but a heavily skewed scene, ruled over by billionaire owners who foment conspiracy, division and outrage for both political effects and profit.[24] Post-truth

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[17] Decorative Newsfeeds (gallery version), Thomson & Craighead. (thomson-craighead.net)
[18] https://www.thomson-craighead.net/dtlv.html See also Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour, *Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form* (Cambridge, MA 1972).
[19] Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly* (Boston, 1983).
[20] Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York, 1988).
[21] Daniel C. Hallin, *The 'Uncensored' War: The Media and Vietnam* (Berkeley, 1986), p. 67.
[22] Jeffrey Klaehn, ed., *Filtering the News: Essays on Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model* (Montreal 2005).
[23] Robert W. McChesney, *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times* (New York, 2000), pp. 51-4.
[24] For a data mapping of this dire scene, see Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris and Hal Roberts, *Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics* (New York, 2018).

here means the knowing propagation of lies, as the Dominion voting-machine case against Fox News clearly documented.

So you can now pick your own soundtrack, as it were, and help make it, too. Yet dominant power remains with super-rich proprietors who can manipulate the views and actions of their readers and users, fostering far-right conspiracies as a tactic to counter radical challenges to the order of profit-taking. As the old neoliberal center fractured in the fall-out from the financial crisis, one elite response has been to spawn neo-fascist monsters.[25]

Thomson and Craighead's intervention is now set in an intense culture of alteration—memes, re-editing, commenting, faking, and an endless and exhaustive cultural analysis of soaps, films, and computer games in an autophagic culture based on the competition for eyeballs and money. If it seems that the digital natives are now perfectly capable of making their own anthropology, in fact many of them act as the algorithms' faithful servants, striving with their incessant digital labor to serve up whatever is demanded.

Mapping Finance

> … this exaltation of the Universal shares, this ascension, carrying them up as if on a divine wind, seemed to harmonize with the louder and louder music from the Tuileries and the Champs-de-Mars, and the continual festivities which were driving Paris mad.[26]

Unlike the other works on show, Autogena and Portway's *Black Shoals* was a spectacular piece of cutting-edge hardware and software, in which a live rendition of the global stock market was projected onto a domed ceiling. Each star/stock burnt brightly or dimly depending on the intensity of its trading, and those that behaved in convergent ways formed clusters, constellations and nebulae, while different economic sectors formed galaxies. Furthermore, artificial life "stockbrokers" fed off the trading, dying when starved and reproducing when replete, as they evolved to predict where the most activity—and the most sustenance—would be.[27]

If spectacle is often used to over-awe and critically disarm viewers, *Black Shoals* bore upon issues which cried out for critique: the dominance of finance capital and financialization in the neoliberal economy; ways of envisaging the operation of capital, either for instrumental purposes (as the artificial life creatures attempt to do) or for a more accessible understanding of the forces that govern so much of our lives. As Fredric Jameson has famously analyzed, this task of plotting one's place in the prevailing system is an immensely difficult thing to do, and the hold of capital is strengthened by how hard it is to grasp and map, leaving its willing and unwilling servants

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[25] Which are distinct from the Fascism of the past; see Enzo Traverso, *The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and the Far Right*, trans. David Broder (London, 2019).

[26] Émile Zola, *Money*, trans. Valerie Minogue (Oxford, 2014), p. 234.

[27] See my essay, "A View from the Fish Tank", in *Black Shoals Stock Market Planetarium: An Art Project by Lise Autogena and Joshua Portway* exh. cat. Nikolaj, Copenhagen Contemporary Art Center (2004), n.p.

adrift, helpless in the face of its ineluctable complexity.[28] Zola, in his novel about financial speculation, *Money*, offered meticulously detailed descriptions of trading but also had frequent recourse to invocations of mystery. For his characters, the fascination of the stock-market bubble was bound up with the Second Empire's flimsy façade of splendor and authority, a front for rampant corruption and hypocrisy, at the moment of the Exposition Universelle of 1867.

Lise Autogena and Joshua Portway, *Black Shoals/ Stock Market Planetarium*, 2001

The technical sophistication of the planetarium also had a cost, however, since it was funded by Reuters' sponsorship. At the exhibition opening, I was surprised to see an interpretative board that was new to me, which offered Reuters's view of the exhibition: a boosterish reading which encouraged viewers to forget critical reflection and wallow in technophilic wonder.

In its Tate showing, and more recently in Somerset House, the stars/ stocks were not named (as they had been in some of the interpretive material), so while viewers could get a general sense of the intensity and structure of the trading, detailed knowledge was withheld.[29] In a mode common across much contemporary art, including large-scale museum photography, video and AI-aided animations, it cultivated an experience of the data sublime—the overwhelming of the viewer

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[28] Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (London, 1991), pp. 51-4.

[29] *Black Shoals* was shown at Somerset House in the exhibition *Big Bang Data*, 2015-16.

with the scale, complexity and speed of data arrays. And, given the dot.com crash, that sublime was one of a Burkean sort, the view from a safe position onto an awesome and belittling scene of disaster.[30]

Since 2001, the environment in which *Black Shoals* was shown has also been transformed. First, because the work may now appear as a harbinger of what became known as post-internet art, of works that drew from the internet but were not confined to it, and which accepted the online state as the natural order of things.[31] Second, because the banks' reckless misuse of the much-vaunted Black-Scholes derivatives formula (that the work's title plays upon) had a role in the financial crash of 2007/8 and all that flowed from it.[32] Third, because in the wake of that crisis, the divergence between the pallid growth of the capitalist economies and the fervid rise of the stock market has drawn in small investors, gambling on viral stocks and crypto in risky DIY systems. These are the folk that Zola described during the Second Empire bubble, "from bourgeois to workman and peasant … hurled into this mad gallop of millions … the whole gaunt, hungry mass of people with tiny incomes, that a catastrophe of the Bourse carries off like an epidemic, and at one stroke lays in a communal paupers' grave."[33]

While the dot.com crisis was often thought of as a temporarily burst bubble, since 2007, the chronic crisis of capitalism has become more widely apparent, caused by a systemic lack of investment, as faith in the future falters. The growing power of monopolies further threatens the system as would-be investors, acting like the *rentiers* of old, hang onto their money or spend it in unproductive ways, and hoard assets (including, of course, art).[34] The various strategies to increase demand and investment, based on colossal increases in public and private debt, and then both at once, all eventually failed in the face of a linked triad: growing monopolization, inequality, and asset prices.[35]

Monopoly and Contradiction

In the face of such sweeping monopolization, we might say that the radical moment of internet art—and of the artistic interventions of RTI and Thompson and Craighead—has foundered. The Autogena and Portway work, by contrast, may be seen as a forerunner of the many works that exploit the effect of the data sublime. The power of that type of art is no accident and no illusion: in monopoly capital and above all with platforms such as Google and Facebook, we are faced with gigantic and disaster-prone powers which may well appear, to their humble users, to be like the capricious and dangerous gods of old.

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[30] See Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* [1757] (Oxford, 1990).
[31] Gene McHugh, *Post Internet: Notes on the Internet and Art* (Brescia, 2011).
[32] Ian Stewart, 'The Mathematical Equation that Caused the Banks to Crash', *The Guardian*, February12, 2012. The Black-Sholes formula effectively reduced the risks of trading in futures and derivatives. It led to a colossal expansion in such trading which, along with the malfeasance of traders and bankers, increased the instability of the markets.
[33] Zola, *Money*, pp. 233-4.
[34] See David Harvey, *A Companion to Marx's* Capital*: The Complete Edition* (London, 2018), pp. 333-6.
[35] Wolfgang Streeck, *Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism* (London, 2014), pp. 36-40. All this is also linked to financialization: see Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times* (London, 2010).

The art world, too, has become more openly a paradigm of monopoly: insider trading, and secrecy over pricing, demand and supply are standard, as is their manipulation. More and more resources flow upwards to a few auction houses, art fairs, galleries, collectors, artist-brands and museums at the apex of the system. Art collecting has become mostly the acquisition of another asset to set alongside real estate and other luxury items, as a way of hedging other investments and dodging taxation. So the rise of post-internet art and commercial art as a whole was driven by financialization and growing inequality which handed huge fortunes to the already super-rich. When, in the polar opposite to the commons, we see massive paintings hung on the walls of private museums, the affinity with the acreage of a landed estate becomes clear.

Yet there are contradictions at work in this development. In an influential essay, David Harvey analyzed the countervailing forces behind monopolization: to achieve a monopoly is to exploit a rent that no one else can. Land is the obvious example: for instance, if you own a vineyard, you can exclusively sell a unique product.[36] The branded artist is a monopolist, and the common ambition of individual artists has long been to remake themselves as a successful brand, out of which they can issue exclusive products. More recently, and especially given the rise of social media, and the tide of propaganda that reinforces meritocratic myths, many people have internalized the need to fashion themselves as brands.[37]

Yet for Harvey any prominent monopoly may become subject to dual pressures—both side-effects of its very success. There is the danger that it becomes so special as to be borne outside of the commodity sphere entirely: Buckingham Palace is Harvey's example, but most museum acquisitions are also like this. The collectors of important art works are seen not just as their owners but as their custodians. Otherwise, there would have been no scandal when a magnate, keen to avoid death duties, burned his Van Gogh.[38]

Or, moving in the opposite direction, in a process Harvey calls "Disneyfication", the monopolized good may become so run-of-the-mill as to undermine its special status. This has become common of many art works, too, through their exposure on and design for social media, and the increasingly rapid, large-scale and standardized circuit of art commerce, which is often viewed wearily as just another asset class.

The long growth crisis in the economy exacerbates this second effect as art works are increasingly used for purely instrumental purposes as financial tools. One result is the "normcore" populist taste of many time-poor and inexpert collectors who drive the market with their hasty purchases, boosting the prices of objects that are the dreary, predictable products of branded artists.[39] Indeed, the uniformity of, say, Damien Hirst spot paintings, is a design feature because it is easy to say exactly what they are worth by looking at the sales data of others in the series.

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[36] David Harvey, "The Art of Rent: Globalization, Monopoly and the Commodification of Culture", *Socialist Register*, vol. 38 (2002), pp. 93-110.

[37] For a personal and political demolition of the meritocracy myth, see Faiza Shaheen, *Know Your Place: How Society Sets Us Up to Fail—and What We Can Do About It* (London, 2023).

[38] Or apparently so: see Philip Hensher, "Burn a Van Gogh and be Famous", *The Independent*, July 27, 1999.

[39] See my essay, "Elite Art in an Age of Populism", in Alexander Dumbadze and Suzanne Hudson, eds., *Contemporary Art: 1989 to the Present* (Oxford 2013), pp. 39-49.

Instagrammable art is designed to produce social media clicks, and to encourage taking selfies. The speculation around NFTs was the most extreme example of a monopoly branding effect that lasted only as long as the bubble continued to expand. Once prices went into free-fall, who would want the Bored Apes and CryptoPunks, those silly, demotic collections of procedurally generated pixels? The weight bearing down hard on the art world is that social media gives no importance to the quality, depth, or duration of an experience, favoring metrics of speed, repetition, viral spread, and momentary "engagement". In this way, the pressures that apply to all commodified experiences and goods crush the enclave of art.

In their path-breaking 1966 book on monopoly capitalism, which linked the system to long-term economic stagnation, imperialism, and social degeneration, Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy wrote that improvements in the means of mass communication "merely hasten the degradation of popular culture. … The irrationality of the end negates all improvement of the means." Their improvement of the means included the growth of color television. Ours are quite different but the point still applies. If things continue as they are, Baran and Sweezy argued, "the compulsions of the system" and human needs would continue to diverge, spreading "increasingly severe psychic disorders"—so much so that the system could undermine itself.[40] In the great tide of mental illness caused by the social media monopolies, we begin to approach that condition.

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[40] Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968) pp. 349-50.